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INTRODUCTION
TWN, Inc., a Utah corporation, ("TWN") commenced this action to quiet title to a parcel
of real property located in Utah (and, it was later learned, partially in Salt Lake) Counties
("Subject Property"). TWN claimed title to the property by reason of a December 8,1998
Quitclaim Deed from Richard Christenson, who had purchased the property at a tax sale from
Utah County, taking a Tax Deed dated July 18,1984. Defendants Uwe and Ullrich Michel
("Michels") asserted a competing claim to the property arising out of their bid at a trust deed sale
conducted by Zions First National Bank on April 14,1993.
All issues were submitted to this Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The
Court concluded that TWN had established, as a matter of law, that it held title to the Subject
Property paramount to any claim of record title held by Michels; it reserved for trial, however,
the issue of whether Michels could assert a claim to the Subject Property based on the doctrine of
adverse possession.
Michels' adverse possession claim was tried to the Court on March 27, 2001. At the
conclusion of trial, the Court held that, based on the evidence, Michels had failed to make out a
claim against the property under the doctrine of adverse possession.
Incident to finalizing the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, Michels
managed to assert, for the first time, the issue of whether the 1984 tax sale of the Subject
Property was invalid due to the fact that one corner of the Subject Property had recently been
determined to lie over the county line in Salt Lake County. The trial court permitted post-trial
briefing of the issue based on stipulated facts. By memorandum decision dated November 8,
2001, the Court ruled that (1) Michels had not raised the issue of the tax sales validity in a timely

545585vl

1

manner, and (2) the claim was, in any event, barred by the applicable statute of limitations. It is
from the Court's November 8, 2001 ruling (entered as a final adjudication of all issues in the
case) that Michels appeal.
The lower court correctly ruled that TWN holds good and valid title 1o the Subject
Property by virtue of the 1984 Tax Deed. Michels have failed to raise any defect in TWN's title whether legal or factual - and may not challenge the validity of TWN's title.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee agrees with appellants' statement of jurisdiction.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW1
1.

Whether the 1984 Tax Deed conveyed valid legal title to the Subject Property to

Richard A. Christenson. (Preserved at R. 725-752; 753-755; 768-778.)
2.

Whether any defect in the title conveyed by the 1984 Tax Deed to Richard A.

Christenson is now cured by operation of Utah Code Ann. § § 78-12-5.1 - 78-12-5.3. (Preserved
at R.725-752; 753-755; 768-778.)
3.

Whether Michels waived, or otherwise failed to preserve properly, the validity of,

and/or defects in, the 1984 tax sale of the Subject Property as an issue before the trial court.
(Preserved at R.725-752; 753-755; 768-778.)
4.

Whether the trial court could properly conclude, based on the record before it,

that the March 19, 1985 Quitclaim Deed from "Richard A. Christenson, Tmstee" to Zions First

Contrary to the requirements of Rule 24 (a) (5), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Michels'
Statement of Issues on Appeal does not cite this Court to any point in the record where their
proposed issues were preserved for appeal. As more fully noted herein, TWN contends that
certain of Michels' claims were not, in fact, timely raised before the trial court, and are therefore
waived.
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National Bank (1) was clearly and unambiguously executed by Richard A. Christenson in his
capacity as trustee, and not in his individual capacity, and (2) conveyed no interest in the Subject
Property held by Richard A. Christenson in his individual capacity. (Preserved at R. 44-46; 238240; 488-490.)
5.

Whether the trial court could properly conclude, based on the record before it, that

Michels had presented no evidence in opposition to TWN's Motion for Summary Judgment
which, if believed, could reasonably have led a trier of fact to find that Richard A. Christenson
intended, by execution of the March 19,1985 Quitclaim Deed from Richard A. Christenson,
Trustee, to Zions First National Bank, to convey his individual interest in the Subject Property
thereby. (Preserved at R. 44-46; 238-240; 488-490.)
6.

Whether Michels may rely on excerpts of the deposition of Richard A.

Christenson taken in the case of Christenson v. Michel et aL, (before the Third District Court for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 960902187), to which TWN was not a party, in
support of their appeal herein when (1) the trial court granted TWN's motion to strike all such
references from the record in this matter, and (2) Michels took no appeal from, and assigned no
error to, the trial court's ruling in that regard. (Preserved at R. 378-380; 488-490.)
7.

Whether Michels could take valid title to the Subject Property by virtue of the

April 13,1993 Trustee's sale, given that it was conducted in Salt Lake County. (Preserved at R.
188-199; 488-490.)
Issues 1 through 3 are mixed questions of fact and law - they were raised before, and
determined by, the trial court for the first time only after all issues framed by the pleadings and
motions had been resolved either by motion for summary judgment or trial (which resulted in
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 622-630)). In addition, however, the trial court's
ruling relied on a set of stipulated facts jointly submitted by the parties (R. 753-755).
Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court's rulings rest either upon facts stipulated to or
questions of law, they should be reviewed for correctness based on the law and facts - Gate City
Federal Savings & Loan v. Dalton, 808 P. 2d 1117 (Utah 1991); In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.
2d 916 (Ct. App. Utah 1988); to the extent that they derived, or could have derived, from the
facts as found by the trial court following trial, they should be reviewed on a "clear error"
standard (Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).
Issues 4 through 7 were determined by the trial court upon TWN's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Michels' Motion for Reconsideration, and should be reviewed in accordance with
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; in making its review, however, this Court must examine
the trial court's determination in light of admissible evidence presented by Michels to the trial
court (drawing all facts and factual inferences derived from such evidence in Michels' favor), and
sustain the trial court if, even in light of such evidence, Michels demonstrated no genuine issue
of triable fact - Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Winegar v. Froerer Corporation,
813 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1991); Gate City Federal Savings & Loan v. Dalton, 808 P. 2d 1117 (Utah
1991); Reagan Outdoor Advertising v. Lundgren, 692 P. 2d 776 (Utah 1984). In addition, this
Court may and should sustain the ruling of the trial court on any legal ground available to the
trial court, whether the trial court relied upon such ground in its holding or not - Higgins v. Salt
Lake County, 855 P. 2d 231 (Utah 1993).
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RULES RELEVANT FOR REVIEW
Rule 12(h), Rule 41(b), Rule 52(a) and Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence, are relevant to the matters before the Court incident to this
appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
TWN filed this action to quiet title to a parcel of real property described as follows:
Commencing 1979 feet West from the Northeast corner of the Northwest
quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; West 1374.6 feet;
North 2630.3 feet; and East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning ("the
Subject Property").
TWN claimed title to the property by virtue of a deed from Richard A. Christenson individually,
dated December 8,1998; Mr. Christenson, in turn, traced his title to a tax deed from Utah
County dated June 29, 1984.
Defendants and appellants Michel challenged the validity of TWN's title, claiming that
they had purchased the Subject Property at a trustee sale on April 13, 1993 from Zions First
National Bank as trustee; in turn, that Zions' title derived from a Quitclaim Deed dated
March 19, 1985 from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee."
The parties submitted all issues to the trial court on cross motions for summary judgment,
TWN's motion dated December 30,1999 (R. 44-46), and Michel's motion dated February 25,
2000 (R. 60-62). TWN maintained that it held valid title to the property by virtue of the 1984
and 1998 deeds. Michels claimed that, by the 1985 deed, Richard Christenson had conveyed all
of his right, title and interest in the Subject Property to Zions First National Bank, from whence
they derived title by virtue of the 1993 trustee's deed; also, that Michels had established
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ownership of the property under the doctrine of adverse possession. TWN disputed adverse
possession of the property by Michels, and further claimed that the 1993 trustee's deed from
Zions Bank was invalid, the trustee's sale having been conducted in the wrong county.
Following oral argument on July 26, 2000, the trial court, the Honorable James Taylor
presiding, denied Michels' motion for summary judgment, and provisionally granted TWN's
motion for summary judgment; subject, however, to a 60-day right in Michels to conduct
discovery on the sole issue of ownership by adverse possession. The Court's ruling was reflected
in a written Order dated August 24, 2000 (R. 238-240).
On September 28,2000, Michels moved the Court to reconsider its Order of Summary
Judgment, arguing that, in finding as a matter of law that the 1984 and 1998 deeds reflected the
true chain of title to the Subject Property, the trial court had improperly disregarded extrinsic
evidence concerning the 1985 Quitclaim Deed to Zions Bank based on the "parol evidence" rule
(R. 336-338).2 At the same time, Michels moved to amend their pleadings to assert a
counterclaim based on the doctrine of adverse possession (R. 331-332), and submitted a
supplemental memorandum on the adverse possession issue (R. 242-255). TWN moved to
strike, from Michels' post-summary judgment submittals, all references to a 1987 deposition
taken of Richard A. Christenson in a matter pending in Salt Lake County (R. 378-380).
Post-summary judgment motions were argued to the Court on December 7, 2000. At the
conclusion of argument, the Court held as follows:

2

The record on appeal contains neither a transcript of the July 26, 2000 hearing nor any minute
entry reflecting any reference to reliance upon the "parol evidence" rule. It is therefore submitted
that the trial court's ruling may or may not have rested on this basis, and is sustainable on
alternate grounds - see Point n, below.
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1.

TWN's motion to strike references to Richard A. Christenson's 1987 deposition

was granted;3
2.

The Court granted Michels' motion for reconsideration of its prior rulings on the

parties' motions for summary judgment;
3.

Having reconsidered its ruling on cross motions for summary judgment, the Court

sustained its prior Order granting summary judgment in favor of TWN, with the sole exception
of the question of adverse possession;
4.

The Court therefore ordered trial on the sole and exclusive issue of adverse

possession; and
5.

Michels were permitted to amend their Answer to include a counterclaim on the

issue of adverse possession.4
The Court's ruling was reflected in a written order dated January 12, 2001 (R. 488-490).
The parties tried the issue of adverse possession to the bench on March 27, 2001. The
Court took evidence, from all parties, concerning all facts relating to Michels' claim of adverse
possession. At the close of Michels' case, TWN moved for judgment under Rule 41(b) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that defendants had failed to make out a case for ownership of
the Subject Property under the doctrine of adverse possession, which the trial court granted (R.

3

Michels take no appeal from the Court's order striking all references to Richard A.
Christenson's 1987 deposition; however, Michels attempt, again, to rely upon statements made in
that deposition incident to their appeal herein. These references are therefore improper, and
should not be considered - see Point II, below.
4

During argument, Michels' counsel apparently requested certification, for appeal, of the Court's
order granting TWN's motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; the speaking motion was denied by the Court's order.
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620-621)5. On April 3,2001, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
incident to its ruling. (R. 622-630). Incident to arguments and objections concerning the Court's
Findings and Conclusions, Michels, for the first time, argued that there was infirmity in the 1984
Tax Deed forming the root of TWN's title, in that a corner of the Subject Property had recently
been determined to lie in Salt Lake County. Michels' objections to TWN's proposed Findings
and Conclusions came before the Court on June 5,2001. 6 At the conclusion of argument, the
Court directed the parties to submit post-trial briefing on the issued raised by Michels concerning
the location of the Subject Property, in part, within Salt Lake County, based upon stipulated facts
(or, if the parties could not agree upon stipulated facts, upon further hearing) (R. 681).
The parties stipulated to facts concerning the boundary issue (R.753-755), briefed the
question and submitted to the Court for decision. In a memorandum decision and order dated
November 8, 2001 (R. 782-785), the Court held as follows: (1) that the boundary line issue was
(a) not jurisdictional, and (b) not raised in a timely manner, and therefore waived; (2) that any
challenge to the validity of the 1984 deed was untimely; and (3) that the Court would affirm the
Findings and Conclusions dated April 3, 2001 (R6 30), and certified its memorandum decision
and order as final.

5

During trial, Michels moved for leave to amend their pleadings to assert a claim that TWN had
not observed corporate formalities; the Court denied the motion to amend, and no appeal is taken
therefrom.
6

The June 5,2001 hearing also dealt with TWN's motion for an award of attorneys fees in
connection with the trial of the issue of adverse possession. The Court denied that motion, and
no appeal has been taken therefrom.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 7
1.

Plaintiff TWN, Inc. is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in

Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 1-9; R. 14-19; R. 622-630).
2.

Defendants Uwe ("Shaun") Michel and Ullrich ("Ollie") Michel are individuals

and residents of the State of Utah. (R. 1-9; R. 14-19; R. 622-630).
3.

Shawn Michel is a licensed real estate broker, and is principal broker for Best

Western Realty. (R. 622-630).
4.

The real property which is the subject of this action is approximately 83 acres of

land located in the area commonly known as Traverse Ridge, and is more particularly described
as follows:
COMMENCING at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast corner of the
Northwest quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 feet;
thence North 2630.3 feet; thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning.
("Subject Property".) (R. 1-9; R. 14-19; R. 622-630).
5.

The Subject Property is located entirely within the boundaries of Draper City. (R.

622-630).
6.

The Subject Property consisted of undeveloped property which (unknown to Utah

County or Salt Lake County) was situated in both Salt Lake County and Utah County. The
majority of the Subject Property was located in Utah County, and a minority was located in Salt
7

A11 facts set out herein derive from one or more of three sources: (1) The pleadings in the case;
(2) undisputed facts submitted to the Court pursuant to motion; and/or (3) the Court's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law derived from the evidence presented during trial on Tuesday,
March 27, 2001. Michels' appeal addresses only questions of law as determined by the lower
court; they have issued no challenge to any factual finding in this matter. Accordingly, all facts
as set out herein should be deemed established for purposes of this appeal.
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Lake County. Due to survey errors corrected in or about 1995, Utah County believed the Subject
Property to be located entirely within Utah County in 1984. (R. 753-755).
7.

Prior to 1984 (and thereafter until 1995), Utah County alone sent out tax billings

on the Subject Property. The Subject Property serial number was B-324-A-B (R. 753-755).
8.

On or about July 1979, Richard McKean ("McKean") was the owner of the

Subject Property, which was thereafter encumbered by the following separate trust deeds:
a.

a Trust Deed from McKean to Zions First National Bank ("Zions"), dated
July 12, 1979; and

b.

a Trust Deed from McKean to Cape Trust, dated October 1,1979;

(R. 1-9; R. 14-19; R. 47-57 and R. 63-85).
9.

On or about July 27,1981, Zions gave "Notice of Default" on the Zions' Deed of

Trust on the Subject Property. (R.l-9; R. 14-19; R. 47-57 and R. 63-85).
10.

On or about July 31,1981 Cape Trust gave "Notice of Default" on the Cape Trust

Deed of Trust on the Subject Property. (R. 1-9; R. 14-19; R. 47-57 and R. 63-85).
11.

On or about April 6, 1982, after a judicial foreclosure proceeding on the Subject

Property under the Zions' Trust Deed, Zions received a Sheriffs Deed on the Subject Property,
foreclosing out all junior lienholders, including the Cape Trust Deed of Trust, leaving no right,
title or interest in the Subject Property to Cape Trust. (R. 1-9; R. 14-19; R. 47-57 and R. 63-85).
12.

On or about June 29,1984, Richard Christenson ("Christenson"), individually,

purchased the Subject Property at a Tax Sale from Utah County for delinquent taxes on the
Subject Property. Said tax deed was recorded in Utah County Recorder's office on July 18,
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1984, as Entry No. 21303, Book 2150, Page 588 of the Official Records of Utah County. (R. 19; R. 14-19; R. 47-59; R/ 63-85; R/ 622-630; R. 753-755).
13.

On September 12,1985, a March 19,1985, Quitclaim Deed to the Property was

recorded from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee" to Zions First National Bank, which had owned
the Property prior to the 1984 tax sale. The Quitclaim Deed was recorded with the office of the
Utah County Recorder as Entry No. 26380 in Book 2245 at Page 405. (R. 1-9; R. 14-19; R. 4759; R. 63-85; R. 622-630; R. 753-755).
14.

Zions First National Bank thereafter conveyed all its interest in the property to

Franklin Financial, which returned a deed of trust to Zions First National Bank. (R. 91-128).
15.

Utah County continued to assess the entire Subject Property after 1985 (R. 753-

16.

On or about April 13,1993, Shaun Michel attended a non-judicial foreclosure sale

755).

being conducted in Utah County by Zions First National Bank as trustee. (R. 622-630).
17.

The April 13,1993 sale by Zions purported to foreclose a trust deed interest in

and to two parcels of real property located in Salt Lake County and Utah County, State of Utah.
(R. 622-630).
18.

Parcel 1 of the real property identified for sale by Zions consisted of

approximately 60 acres located predominantly in Salt Lake County, and is not at issue in this
case; parcel 2 of the property offered by Zions consisted of the Subject Property. (R. 622-630).
19.

Shaun Michel did not attend the April 13,1993 trustee's sale intending to bid on

either the Salt Lake Property or the Subject Property, and was present for other unrelated matters.
Michels had in fact had no notice that the Subject Property was to be the subject of a sale until
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the night of April 12,1993. Upon learning that a trustee's sale on the two properties would be
conducted, however, Shaun Michel quickly reviewed a title report furnished by Zions First
National Bank, and elected to place a bid on both the properties. (R. 622-630).
20.

Shaun Michel was the high bidder at the trustee's sale on April 13,1993, and

received a trustee's deed to both the Subject Property and the Salt Lake Property on April 14,
1993. (R. 622-630).
21.

On or about April 14,1993, Michels received a trustee's deed from Zions,

conveying to them individually all of Zions' right, title and interest in and to the Salt Lake
Property and the Subject Property. A trustee's deed was recorded with the office of the Utah
County Recorder the same day. (R. 622-630).
22.

Michels have never received any conveyance of any rights, title or interest in and

to the Subject Property from any third party, other than the April 14,1993 trustee's deed from
Zions (R. 622-630).
23.

In 1995, pursuant to a survey conducted by the Utah and Salt Lake County

Surveyors' offices, it was determined that a portion of the Property was actually located in Salt
Lake County. Thereafter, and through the current time, Utah County has assessed only 77.224
acres of the Property and takes the position that such portion of the Property is located in Utah
County. (R. 753-755).
24.

TWN acquired its interest in the Property pursuant to a Quitclaim Deed from

Richard A. Christenson, individually, dated December 8,1998, and recorded in the office of the
Utah County Recorder on December 17, 1998, as Entry No. 132243 in Book 4904 at Page 845.
(R. 753-755).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE 1984 TAX SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS
NOT JURISDICTIONALLY INVALID, AND CONVEYED
GOOD TITLE TO RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON
INDIVIDUALLY.
Point 2 of Michels' brief asserts that the 1984 tax sale, which resulted in a conveyance of
the Subject Property to Richard A. Christenson (TWN's predecessor in title) was jurisdictionally
invalid, in that it included property outside of Utah County. While Michels' brief does not make
the point clear, it appears that their intent in seeking to invalidate an 18-year old tax sale is to
cause title to revert to Zions First National Bank, and trace it from there to the trustee's deed of
April 14,1993.
Michels' argument in this regard, however, suffers from three fundamental failings. First,
it was not properly presented to the lower court, and must be deemed waived in accordance with
the trial court's ruling. Second, the 1984 tax sale did not embrace property outside the
boundaries of Utah County as known at the time it was conducted. Third, any infirmity in the
1984 tax sale has long since been cured by operation of Utah Code Ann. § § 78-12-5.1 through
78-12-5.3.

A.

Michels' Claims Concerning the 1984 Tax Sale were Not Timely Raised
Before the Trial Court, and Must be Deemed Waived.

Rule 12(h) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states as follows:
A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense's failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the defense's failure to join an indispensable party, and the
objection or failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by later
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pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at trial
on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties
or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action.
Michels' claim that there was an infirmity in the 1984 tax sale, thereby defeating TWN's
root of title, did not constitute a Rule 12 (b) (6) motion; neither did it challenge the trial court's
subject matter jurisdiction. It was therefore incumbent upon Michels to raise the validity of the
1984 tax sale at some point in their pleadings. This Michels flatly failed to do.
At paragraphs 10-11 of its Complaint (R. 1-9), TWN alleged that the 1984 tax sale to
Richard Christenson was valid in all respects; further, that any challenge thereto was barred by
operation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.2. In their Answer (R. 14-19), Michels acknowledged
that the sale had taken place more than four years before, but generally denied that their
challenge was time-barred. Michels plead no separate claim that the tax sale was invalid due to
the location of the Salt Lake/Utah County line. See Answer (R. 14-19) at paragraphs 10 and 11;
Counterclaim (R. 323-330). TWN then brought a motion for summary judgjnent on all issues in
the action (R. 44-46); the general question of the 1984 tax sale's validity was expressly briefed
and addressed therein. Again, nowhere in their briefing did Michels challenge the validity of the
1984 tax sale by reason of the county line location, or claim that the wrong county conveyed to
Christenson. In its ruling, the trial court granted summary judgment on all issues except one:
whether Michels could establish a claim to the property by adverse possession. It was on this
issue alone that the case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the evidence8, the trial court
8

The Court should note that, during the trial on adverse possession, defendant Uwe Michel
expressly testified that he believed a portion of the Subject Property to lie in Salt Lake County;
clearly, defendants were aware of the substance of their claim before that time, yet chose not to
raise it until after trial.
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ruled that the elements of adverse possession had not been met. Only incident to thefinalization
of findings and conclusions following trial did Michels voice the theory that the 1984 tax deed
was assailable due to a portion of the property falling into Salt Lake County.
Accordingly, in its November 8,2001 Memorandum Decision and Order (R. 782-785),
the trial court noted the following:
The plaintiffs argue, first of all, that the defendants should not be entitled to bring
this new issue [the validity of the 1984 tax sale] before the Court after summary
judgment and trial on a narrow and different issue. The Court has allowed the
question to be heard because of the argument that the question was not procedural
but jurisdictional. Jurisdiction cannot be waived or created by stipulation.
Nevertheless, after considering the briefs and stipulated facts, the Court is
satisfied that this question is not jurisdictional and that the Court did have
jurisdiction to issue a final judgment as ordered. The issue was not raised in a
timely manner and should not, therefore, have been considered.
Michels have nowhere appealed the lower court's ruling in this regard. They did not
respond before the lower court to the untimeliness of their argument; nowhere in the trial court
record did they preserve their objection to the trial court's ruling; and there is nothing before this
court on appeal assigning as error the lower court's refusal to consider their arguments on the
validity of the 1984 tax sale due to untimeliness. On this basis alone, therefore, all such
arguments must be rejected, and the lower court's ruling thereon affirmed.
B.

The 1984 Tax Sale was Not an Attempt, by Utah County, to Exert Taxing
Jurisdiction Over Property Lying Outside of its Boundaries, as the Subject
Property was Properly Located In, and Taxable By, Utah County in 1984.

Even had Michels timely raised the validity of the 1984 tax sale, their argument far
overstates the issue. Michels attempt to bootstrap a clerical error in the Utah County Recorder's
Office into a jurisdictional crisis between Salt Lake and Utah Counties over which entity had
proper taxing power. First, Michels do not even have standing to raise any such challenge.
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Neither does any such conflict or crisis exist. As the Stipulated Facts submitted by the parties (R.
622-630) establish, everyone - Utah County, Salt Lake County, and all participants in the 1984
tax sale process - believed the property to be located in Utah County. Utah County was the only
taxing entity. Had Salt Lake County been assessing a portion of the property, and going unpaid,
Richard Christenson could (and likely would) have attended a tax sale for any portion of the
property lying within Salt Lake County. But at the time of the tax sale (and for more than a
decade thereafter), no one was aware of any inaccuracy in the Utah County (or, presumedly, the
Salt Lake County) survey. Rather, the Subject Property was included on the Utah County tax
rolls, and wholly taxed by Utah County, in 1984 - and indeed until 1995. Only in that year did a
joint survey between Utah and Salt Lake Counties uncover the fact that certain section comer
markers had been mislocated. The resulting corrections to those placements edged one comer of
the Subject Property over the county line into Salt Lake County.
The effect of the 1995 survey, in short, was the equivalent of a relocation of the Subject
Property such that a portion thereof became located in, and subject to taxation by, Salt Lake
County. To use the 1995 redetermination of the Subject Property's location as a device for
invalidating, nunc pro tunc, a 1984 tax deed would not only do violence to the applicable statute
of limitations (see below), but would ignore reality completely. The Court is urged, in this
regard, to consider the practical implications of any attempt to assail a 1984 tax deed on the
grounds urged by Michels herein. Section comers, quarter comers, boundary lines, and even
county lines were first established in this area through survey techniques employed by settlers in
the mid-19th Century. 21st Century surveying methods (including lasers, global positioning
satellite technology, and the like) have encountered, and will likely continue to encounter,
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countless surveying errors in the original settlers' efforts to lay out the Wasatch Front - errors
which, in some instances, are off by more than a mile. Were every tax deed encompassing a
corner of property relocated (years later) such that it falls in some part outside the boundaries of
the taxing county to be hereafter forever assailable, district courts would be endlessly at the task
of unraveling decades-old tax conveyances and titles9.
Michels' reliance on Baxter v. Utah Dept of Transportation, 783 P.2d 1045 (Ct. App.
Utah 1989) is completely misplaced. Baxter did not deal with a clerical survey error at all;
certainly it did not hold that such an error, discovered eleven years after the fact, mandated
invalidation of a tax sale. The court in Baxter dealt exclusively with one issue, expressly framed
by the parties: whether the county line between Davis and Weber Counties had shifted to the
south of the property at issue due to a change in the center channel of the Weber River over
time10. The Court held that the county line was established by the territorial legislature in 1855,
and had remained fixed since that time, not following subsequent course changes of the river.
Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that the property at issue in that case had not moved
from Davis to Weber County. Since this was the sole issue presented by the parties, the Court
reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with the ruling that the plaintiffs tax deed was
valid.
The issue before the trial court in this case did not deal with any claimed relocation of the
Salt Lake/Utah County line. As noted at the outset, the sole issue urged by Michels is whether,
9

It is just this sort of problem, in fact, which lay at the heart of the four-year statute of repose
addressed at subpoint C, below.
10

With respect to the statute of limitations question as dealt with in Baxter, see subpoint C,
below.
545585vl

17

due to a survey error dating back to statehood, a 1984 tax conveyance of property thought to be
entirely within Utah County, but discovered in 1995 to encroach at one comer over the Salt Lake
County line, must fail ab initio. TWN submits that the validity of the tax sale must be upheld not
only on the basis of the four-year statute of limitations (see below), but on the undisputed fact
that, in 1984, the property was properly located in Utah County. The county line between Salt
Lake and Utah Counties was not shifted by the 1995 resurvey of the Traverse Ridge area, nor
does anyone claim otherwise. The 1995 resurvey, however, did effectively relocate the Subject
Property in relation to the county line, by more accurately determining the location of section
comers long believed to place the Subject Property within Utah County. Due to the revised
survey information, a small corner of the Subject Property (as well as, presumedly, portions of
many other properties adjacent to the county line) was determined to lie over the county line.
These issues were neither presented to, nor decided by the Court of Appeals in Baxter. As the
trial court properly observed at one point, such errors are, (to say the least), common in a day
when global positioning and laser technology is used to revisit 19th Century surveys. Michels'
invitation is effectively to expand Baxter to the point of invalidating every tax sale since
statehood where such a subsequent resurvey reveals a county line encroachment.
The simple fact of the matter is that, as of the time of the 1984 tax sale forming the root
of TWN's title, the Subject Property was within Utah County's boundaries according to the
reasonable interpretation - by both counties - of the proper location of the section comer and
quarter markers to which its description related, and their position vis-a-vis the county line.
Conveyance of the property to Richard Christenson by Utah County in 1984 was therefore
wholly valid.
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C.

Any Challenge to the Validity of Utah County's 1984 Tax Deed to Richard A.
Christenson is Barred by the Applicable Statute of Repose.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 through 5.3 have, since 1957, been interpreted to impose a
four-year statute of limitations on any challenge to title to real property derived from a tax sale,
unless the challenger was in possession of the property during the four years following the tax
sale. Those provisions read in their entirety as follows:
No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall be
maintained, unless the plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or possessed of such
property within seven years from the commencement of such action; provided,
however, that with respect to actions or defenses brought or interposed for the
recovery or possession of or to quiet title or determine the ownership of real
property against the holder of a tax title to such property, no such action or
defense shall be commenced or interposed more than four years after the date of
the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer creating such tax title unless the person
commencing or interposing such action or defense or his predecessor has actually
occupied or been in possession of such property within four years prior to the
commencement or interposition of such action or defense or within one year from
the effective date of this amendment.
ije ije jjc :je ije

No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property or to quiet
title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed against
the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale,
conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly to any other
purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and after the expiration of one
year from the date of this act. Provided, however, that this section shall not bar
any action or defense by the owner of the legal title to such property where he or
his predecessor has actually occupied or been in actual possession of such
property within four years from the commencement or interposition of such action
or defense. And provided further, that this section shall not bar any defense by a
city or town, to an action by the holder of a tax title, to the effect that such city or
town holds a lien against such property which is equal or superior to the claim of
the holder of such tax title.
* * * * *
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(1) The term "tax title" as used in Section 78-12-5.2 and Section 59-2-1364, and
the related amended Sections 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to
real property, whether valid or not, which has been derived through or is
dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or transfer of property in the course of a
statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against the property
whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien.
(2) The word "action" as used in these sections includes counterclaims and
cross-complaints and all civil actions wherein affirmative relief is sought.
In 1957, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the foregoing provisions to impose a fouryear statute of limitations on challenges to tax titles when the challenger had not been in
possession of the property during any of the four years following the tax sale. In Peterson v.
Callister, 313 P.2d. 814 (Utah 1957), the plaintiff sought to acquire title to a parcel of property in
San Juan County which had been passed down to him through a series of invalid conveyances
following a tax sale in 1926. The court agreed with the defendant that the conveyances had been
insufficient to pass legal title to the plaintiff nevertheless, the court held for the plaintiff on the
basis of the statute of limitations. Observing that the defendant had not been in possession of the
property during any of the four years immediately following the tax sale, the court held that,
according to the manifest intention of the legislature in enacting 78-12-5.1 through 5.3, no claim
to challenge the validity of the tax title could be mounted:
...[W]e believe the legislature had in mind a four-year statute of limitations
barring claims against tax titles, which four-year period dated from the initiation
of the tax title, during which period any claimant against tax title must have had
possession of the property to protect any claim he might have.
313 P.2d. 816 (emphasis added).
In 1981, the court again addressed the time limit for challenging the validity of tax titles.
In the case ofFrederiksen v. La Fleur, 632 P.2d. 827 (Utah 1981), record title holders of real
property located in Salt Lake County challenged the validity of title claimed by the plaintiffs
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through a tax sale in 1970. The lower court held that the tax sale had been invalid, and therefore
had conveyed no proper title; that since the tax purchasers had no valid claim to the property
themselves, they had no basis to assert a statute of limitations defense thereon; and that the
record title holders were entitled to a presumption of possession, thereby defeating the language
of the statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court reversed on all grounds, holding that plaintiffs' tax title was validated
by Utah Code Ann. §§78-12-5.1 to 5.3. Concerning the history of those sections, the court began
by observing that tax titles had traditionally been assailed by legal decisions on a variety of
technical grounds, giving rise to express legislative protection in the State of Utah:
In order to give increased stability to tax titles and thereby augment the revenues
of state and local governments, in 1951 the Utah Legislature enacted a special
statute of limitations applicable to tax titles. Sections 78-12-5.1-5.3. Section 7812-5.1 provides, inter alia, that no action for the recovery or possession of or to
quiet title to real property may be commenced against the holder of a tax title
more than four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer
creating the tax title, unless the person commencing the action has "actually
occupied or been in possession" of the disputed property within four years of the
commencement of the action. . ..
Section 78-12-5.3 defines "tax title" in the
preceding sections as "any title to real property, whether valid or not, which has
been derived through a tax sale."
632 P.2d. at pp. 828-829. As in Peterson, The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that
plaintiffs' chain of title was defective and that the tax sale was therefore invalid; nevertheless, the
court held plaintiffs eligible to invoke the statute of limitations:
Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 bar actions or defenses against "the
holder of a tax title." Section 78-12-5.3 defines "tax title" as "any title to real
property, whether valid or not" derived from a tax sale.
Our legislature could hardly have expressed itself more clearly. This
Court has often cited and applied Section 78-12-5.3 to permit holders of invalid or
questionable tax titles to claim protection under the special limitations statute.
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[citations]. We see no reason to depart from these precedents or to reject the plain
meaning of the statute. We therefore hold that these tax purchasers may avail
themselves of the special statute of limitations regardless of the invalidity of their
tax title, or their inability to establish an affirmative claim to title apart from their
tax title.
632 P.2d. at p. 831 (emphasis in original).
In Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d. 786 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court again affirmed
the sanctity of a tax title (as defined at 78-12-5.3) at any time after four years from the date of the
tax sale. In that action, the named defendants claimed title to the Subject Property in Salt Lake
County through a tax sale (which ironically, occurred in 1984); plaintiffs claimed that
defendants' tax title was invalid, as tax liens assessed against the property for 1981 were illegal
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity (the Utah Small Business Administration having
acquired title to the property in 1981).
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
tax title holders. Again, while acknowledging that the SBA enjoyed sovereign immunity during
its ownership of the property, the court observed that the four-year limitations period was
dispositive:
Our statutory definition of "tax title" is, in relevant part:
"Tax title" . . . means any title to real property, whether valid or not, which
has been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or transfer of
property in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax
levied against the property whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.3 (emphasis added). To give full effect to the
above statute, it makes no difference if the tax title is valid. Once the four-year
statute of limitations has run, the tax title cannot be attacked.
836 P.2d. at p.790 (emphasis in original).
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It was stipulated before the trial court that in 1984 (and for years thereafter), Utah County
had long been assessing taxes against the Subject Property in its entirety - and that the 1984 tax
sale was conducted "in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied
against the property whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien". Even setting aside the
question of whether the inclusion, in the property transferred, of one comer which was thereafter
identified to lie outside of Utah county impacted the tax sale in any way (see above), the most
that Michels can assert is that, as to that portion of the property so affected, TWN's tax title is
somehow invalid. The Utah Legislature has stated very clearly that, valid or not, tax title may
not be assailed at any time after four years from the date of the tax sale, in order to permit some
measure of stability of tax titles. The policy of the law is clear, and clearly applicable in this
case.
Michels have no meaningful response to the clear applicability of the statute of
limitations on which TWN relies. They attempt only an unsupported distinction between
"jurisdictional errors" and "procedural irregularities". None of the case law makes such a
distinction.
By definition, a statute of limitations does not extinguish, or otherwise affect, the
existence or nature of a legal right. It merely bars a legal challenge after a certain point in time.
See Records v. Briggs, 882 P.2d 864 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The purpose of time limitations on
challenges to tax titles is to permit reliance upon legal title to real property after a certain period
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of time by barring challenges to that title - regardless of what merit they might have had if timely
pursued11.
Given Michels' reliance on the Baxter decision, this Court should note that the statute of
repose question was referenced with favor in a footnote to its decision therein. The ruling in
Baxter, in fact, validated plaintiffs tax deed by holding that the original county line established
by the territorial legislature in 1855 had not shifted with the meandering of the Weber River, thus
obviating the necessity of addressing the limitations question; further, that (as this Court took
pains to point out) neither of the parties before the lower court had raised the four-year statute,
or relied upon its provisions.12 Even though the limitations question was not properly before it
or germane to its decision, however, this Court offered the following dictum in its ruling:
The strength and stability of title acquired by tax deed are aided b y . . . the fouryear statute of limitations barring untimely affirmative actions or defenses that
challenge tax titles, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 (1987), which
applies even if the tax title is invalid.
783 P.2d at 1047 (emphasis added). As noted at subpoint B., above, Baxter involved a claim by
the Utah Department of Transportation that (due to a shift in the center line of the Weber River)
Davis County had conducted a tax sale of property located wholly in Weber County. Had the
argument urged by plaintiffs in this action (that a "jurisdictional" defect in tax title is not barred

n

By Michels' definition, no statute of limitations or repose would be effective to defeat a
challenge to any title to real property where the defendant could be shown not to have received
valid conveyance of title ab initio. The entire purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-6 (confining
challenges to title of real property to seven years) would evaporate.
,2

That a claim or defense based upon the statute of limitations is waived unless raised timely, see
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1952); Staker v. Huntington
Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983); Keller v. Southwood North Medical
Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998).
545585vl

24

by the four-year statute of limitation) been the law, this Court certainly would have mentioned
this fact in connection with its discussion of the statute.
Defendants further attempt to buttress their position by offering an imaginary horrible: the
taxing authority of one county deliberately attempting to sell, at tax sale, property located wholly
within another remote county which also taxes the same property. There is no need to address
the impact of the four-year statute of repose on such a hypothetical situation in this case13.
Again, the Subject Property was, at all times prior to 1995, treated by all taxing entities as if
wholly located within Utah County. The inadvertence discovered in 1995, which shifted section
comers such that a small portion of the property lapped over into Utah County, does not even rise
to the level of "procedural irregularity" indicated in most cases dealing with the issue.
In fact, and for those reasons addressed at subpoint B, above, TWN submits that it is
precisely the sort of inadvertence by county land surveyors in this case that this special statute of
limitations was enacted to remedy. Were Michels permitted to disregard the limitations period,
and attack a 1984 tax deed because - unknown to the taxing entity at the time - one comer of the
property would in 1995 be relocated such that it lapped over a county line, unknown numbers of
tax titles would be placed in jeopardy. Should the Court accept Michels' argument concerning
the "jurisdictional" restrictions on the statute of repose, and rule that Christenson's tax title is
still assailable by a remote grantee after more than 15 years, the owner of every parcel of real
property abutting a county line in the state of Utah should be put on notice that, if a tax sale of
his or her parcel exists anywhere in the chain of title, regardless of date, the validity of his or her

13

Such a circumstance would of necessity invoke a constitutional challenge by the affected
counties themselves, something which neither Salt Lake nor Utah Counties has asserted here.
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title to that property is now in jeopardy, should a present or future resurvey of that property call
any prior survey into question. Acceptance of defendants' argument in this case would keep both
the courts and the title companies in Utah very busy for a long time.
D.

The Language of the Tax Deed Does Not Restrict its Efficacy to Utah County.

TWN acknowledges that the 1984 tax deed forming the root of its title refers to a parcel
of property located in Utah County - an assumption shared by all concerned prior to 1995. The
same deed, however, gives a metes and bounds description of a rectangular parcel of real
property consisting of 83 acres.
By law, a metes and bounds description in a deed is operative to convey all the property
lying within the boundaries so established, and the metes and bounds description takes precedent
over other, more general descriptive terms (even if in conflict with the metes and bounds
description) where such is clearly the intent of the grantor. In particular, a failure to designate the
correct county in which property is located does not defeat the legal sufficiency of the description
provided the metes and bounds properly tie the property to a valid point of beginning located
with respect to a proper range and township. See, generally, Casner (ed.), American Law of
Property, §§ 12.115-12.122; 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, § 51 and 59.
The language of the tax deed at issue here clearly does not intentionally limit its effect to
only that portion of the metes and bounds description determined, eleven years after the fact, to
be located within Utah County. Parol evidence in the form of the Stipulated Facts now before
the Court clearly establish that, at the time the tax deed issued, all parties believed that the entire
parcel was located within Utah County. The intent of the parties to the deed, therefore, was to
convey all 83 acres enclosed within the metes and bounds description.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, THE 1985 QUITCLAIM DEED WAS
INEFFECTIVE TO TRANSFER THE INTEREST OF
RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON, INDIVIDUALLY, TO ZIONS
FIRST NATIONAL BANK.
Unable to defeat the validity of the 1984 Tax Deed to Richard A. Christenson, Michels
next attempt to dispute the trial court's finding that, as a matter of law, Mr. Christenson did not
transfer all of his individual right, title and interest to Zions First National Bank through
conveyance of a Quitclaim Deed on March 19, 1985. The gravamen of Michels' argument is
this:
a.

Mr. Christenson signed the 1985 Quitclaim Deed to Zions First National Bank

"Richard A. Christenson, Trustee", yet the deed does not identify the trust on behalf of which he
was acting;
b.

The deed therefore became "ambiguous", thus warranting consideration of

extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity;
c.

The trial court, however, refused to consider extrinsic evidence, invoking the

"parol evidence rule", and held that, as a matter of law, the 1985 Quitclaim Deed conveyed no
interest in the Subject Property belonging to Mr. Christenson individually.
Nowhere in the record before this Court is the trial court's supposed invocation of the
"parol evidence rule" set out. Michels have produced no transcript of the ruling, and no minute
entry or other written record exists.14 The record before the Court, rather, establishes only that
14

In their motion to reconsider (R 336-338), Michels argue the applicability of the parol evidence
rule, and TWN responded accordingly. The court's ruling on that motion (R. 488-490), however
made no reference to whether the court declined any consideration of extrinsic evidence by
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the trial court rejected, as a matter of law, the proposition that the 1985 Quitclaim Deed
conveyed any interest in the Subject Property belonging to Richard A. Christenson individually.
Not only the parol evidence rule, but numerous other legal bases, exist to sustain the trial court's
ruling.
A.

The Language of the 1985 Quitclaim Deed was Unambiguous in Establishing
that Richard A. Christenson was Executing it in His Trustee Capacity and
Not His Individual Capacity, and the Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence
Varying That Fact was Prohibited by the Parol Evidence Rule.

As the Michels themselves acknowledge, it is well established that, in interpreting the
language of a deed-as with writings generally-the Court enforces the intention of the parties,
which it determines in the first instance from the four corners of the deed itself. Where the
written language is susceptible of more than one interpretation, and is therefore ambiguous, the
Court may resort to extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity; it may not, however, rely upon
extrinsic to vary the unambiguous terms of the deed. In 1979, the Utah Supreme Court stated the
following in the case of Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979):
In the absence of ambiguity, the construction of deeds is a question
of law for the court, and the main object in construing a deed is to
ascertain the intention of the parties, especially that of the grantor,
from the language used. . . . deeds are to be construed like other
written instruments, and where a deed is plain and unambiguous,
parol evidence is not admissible to vary its terms. It is the court's
duty to construe a deed as it is written, and in the final analysis,
each instrument must be construed in light of its own language and
peculiar facts. It is also well known that the intention of the parties
to a conveyance is open to interpretation only when the words used
are ambiguous".

reason of the parol evidence rule.
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596 P.2d at page 656 (emphasis in original). This Court reaffirmed the foregoing language in the
case of Gillmor v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703 (Ct. App. Utah 1995) ("It is the court's duty to
construe instruments as written and deeds are to be construed like other written instruments . . .
when a deed is plain and unambiguous, 'parol evidence is not admissible to vary its terms'
[citation omitted]" - 904 P.2d at page 706).
Michels correctly observe that, while Mr. Christenson signed the 1985 Quitclaim Deed as
"trustee", the document itself does not identify which trust he was representing. What Michels'
argument glosses over, however, is the fact that the identity of the trust on behalf of which Mr.
Christenson was acting was not a genuine issue of material fact before the trial court The
critical issue, rather, was whether the 1985 Quitclaim Deed conveyed any interest held by Mr.
Christenson individually in the Subject Property. The Court needed no extrinsic evidence to
resolve this question, as the language which Mr. Christenson, as grantor, used was clear and
unambiguous-he was acting as a trustee, and not on his own behalf. To consider extrinsic parol
evidence for the purpose of determining whether-despite the use of the word "trustee"-Mr.
Christenson intended, on March 19,1985, to convey his personal interest in the Subject Property
to Zions Bank would indeed have been to rely upon parol evidence to vary the terms of the
instrument. Indeed, it would have violated not only the parol evidence rule, but a fundamental
tenet of construction of written instruments: never to impose an interpretation on a writing
which renders one or more of its terms meaningless. See Larraby v. Royal Dairy Products
Company, 614 P.2d 160 (Utah 1980) ('"where questions arise the first source of inquiry is within
the document itself;... it should be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with its purpose;.
. . all of its parts should be given affect insofar as that is possible"-614 P.2d at page 163).
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Michels would have the trial court (and now this Court) draw upon evidence extrinsic to the
document itself for the sole purpose of eliminating the word "trustee" therefrom, a measure
clearly contrary to law.
Michels' reliance on the Missouri case of Penrod v. Henry, 706 S.W, 2d 537 (Ct. App.
Mo. 1986) is inappropriate, and in fact punctuates the distinction in this case. In Pendrod, the
seller of a water system servicing a subdivision near Branson, Missouri deeded the system to
"Donald Penrod, trustee", but for the undisputed benefit of all homeowners in the subdivision
being serviced by the system. The deed was pursuant to a contract of sale of the system, which
named only five men as buyers. The issue before the court was whether the named transferee
was trustee for the five buyers under the contract (who had asserted ownership of the system and
wished to sell it), or for all owners on the system. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that
extrinsic evidence was admissible to resolve this question.
In this case, by contrast, Michels urge that the supposed ambiguity created by Mr.
Christenson's use of the term "trustee" creates a question of act whether he conveyed his own
interest with the 1985 Quitclaim Deed - whether he was personally a party to the transaction.
This was never suggested as a possible interpretation of the deed in Penrod. Mr. Penrod, it was
clear, took title as trustee for someone; the only question was the identity of the beneficiary(ies).
That he was a trustee party, though, was clear and unambiguous from the document.
B,

Michels Furnished the Trial Court with No "Extrinsic Evidence" Tending to
Establish that Richard A. Christenson Executed the 1985 Quitclaim Deed on
his Own Behalf, Rather Than on Behalf of a Trust.

Even if the trial court had agreed with Michels that the parol evidence rule did not
prohibit the examination of extrinsic evidence to determine the capacity in which Richard A.
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Christenson executed the 1985 Quitclaim Deed, it was incumbent upon Michels to produce
competent, admissible evidence tending to establish that Mr. Christenson's actual intent was not
to represent a trust, but his own interest, in conveying the deed to Zions. See Rule 56(e), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure; Treolggan v. Treolggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985); Reagan Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). In other words, Michels needed to
show not only an ambiguity in the writing, but extrinsic evidence interpreting the writing in their
favor.
In an effort to comply with this requirement, Michels supplied the trial court with a series
of excerpts from Richard A. Christenson's deposition taken in the case of Christenson v. Michel,
et al (before the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 960902187)
("Christenson deposition excerpts"). They have again relied upon these self-same deposition
experts in their argument before this Court. Yet Michels' reliance in this regard is both improper
and unavailing.
1.

Michels did not appeal the lower court's order striking the
Christenson deposition excerpts, and may therefore not rely upon
them on appeal.

As noted in the statement of the case above, TWN moved the trial court to strike all
references to the Christenson deposition from Michels' submittals below, which motion was
granted by order of the trial court on January 12, 2001 (R. 488-490). Nowhere in the course of
this appeal have Michels assigned error to this ruling. It was not specified as a basis for their
appeal in their docketing statement, nor was it addressed in their opening brief. Accordingly, the
lower court's order striking the Christenson deposition excerpts from the record stands
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unchallenged. Michels may not ignore that order before this court, and argue testimony which is
not part of the record below.
The lower court's ruling on this point, moreover, was entirely correct. TWN was not a
party to the prior litigation, and had no opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Christenson or
challenge the statements being offered. As the testimony was not being introduced as prior
inconsistent testimony to impeach statements before the court in this case, moreover, its
admissibility was barred by the hearsay rule. See Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence. In short,
Michels are improperly reaching outside the record of this case to find evidence in an attempt to
reverse the trial court's ruling on summary judgment. The ruling of the trial court, however,
should be examined, and sustained, based only upon the record properly before it.15
2.

Michels offer no extrinsic evidence tending to establish that Richard
A. Christenson intended to convey his personal interest in the Subject
Property to Zions First National Bank*

Even disregarding the impropriety of offering the Christenson deposition excerpts
addressed in Michels' opening brief, nothing in the improperly-offered testimony assists Michels
in challenging the trial court's ruling. In none of Mr. Christenson's offered declarations does he
suggest that, in signing the 1985 Quitclaim Deed as "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee," he
actually intended to convey his own, individual interest in the Subject Property to the bank.
Certainly, Mr. Christenson exhibited confusion as to which trust he was representing when
15

For reasons unexplained, Michels reference - and attach - a June 2, 2000 order of Salt Lake
County Judge David Young in the Salt Lake lawsuit, holding that Richard A. Christenson held no
right, title or interest in the Subject Property as of that date. By June of 2000, of course, TWN
had taken conveyance of the property, and Mr. Christenson held no interest therein any more.
The issues and parties before the court in the Salt Lake action, in any event, are not part of this
appeal, and the holding of the trial court herein - not Judge Young's ruling - the only matter
properly before this Court.
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executing the deed (a fact explained in his affidavit before the trial court in this action - see R.
231-235). Mr. Christenson also acknowledged having omitted the Subject Property from certain
of his personal financial statements prepared after 1985, although no testimony is offered which
would suggest that the omission was due to his having intended to convey the property to Zions
First National Bank. But Michels fail outright to supply any evidence - whether written or verbal
- establishing that, when signing the 1985 Quitclaim Deed, Mr. Christenson intended to act on
behalf of wo trust, but on his own behalf. Even were such extraneous evidence admissible,
despite operation of the parol evidence rule and the court's order granting TWN's Motion to
Strike, there was simply no evidence before the lower court from which reasonable minds could
divine such an intent.
C.

To the Extent that the 1985 Quitclaim Deed Failed to Identify the Grantor, It
is Not Ambiguous, but Void.

In raising the fact that the 1985 Quitclaim Deed fails to identify the trust on which Mr.
Christenson was acting, Michels may have opened a Pandora's box. The 1985 Quitclaim Deed is
Michels' sole source of title, and by pointing out that the grantor is unnamed in the body of the
document, Michels may have defeated its efficacy entirely.
Powell on Real Property states the following with respect to deeds which fail to identify
the parties thereto:
Several issues may arise in regard to the proper designation of the parties to a
deed. First, there may be a question as to whether the parties are designated and
in existence. Second, there may be an issue as to whether the parties are
adequately identified in the deed so as to distinguish them from all other possible
persons. . .. A deed that completely fails to identify either the grantor or the
grantee is totally void. It is implicitly true that every transfer requires at least two
persons - one to make the transfer and one to receive it. In the common law
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context, it was necessary that there be someone to deliver seizin and someone to
receive it.
14 Powell on Real Property (2000 ed.) at § 81A.04[l][a][I], page 81A-37 (emphasis added).
Michels' suggestion that the 1985 Quitclaim Deed fails to identify the trust which is the grantor,
then, goes to far more than the question of ambiguity. If the grantor is not identified in the deed
itself, it cannot operate to convey title at all1(>. The question is not one of interpretation, but of
legal sufficiency. To accept Michels' claim, therefore, would be to establish that the 1985
Quitclaim Deed conveyed no interest - whether that of Mr. Christenson, a trust, or otherwise.
POINT III
MICHELS COULD NOT TAKE VALID TITLE TO ANY
PORTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY LYING IN
UTAH COUNTY IN ANY EVENT, AS THE SALE WAS
CONDUCTED IN SALT LAKE COUNTY
Michels' argument concerning the 1984 tax sale has an interesting counterpart in their
own source of title. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-25 (2) (as it read in 1993), captioned "Notice of
trustee's sale - Description of property-Time and Place of Sale", states:
The (trustee) sale shall be held at the time and place in the notice of sale which
shall be between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. and at the courthouse of the
county in which the property to be sold, or some part thereof, is situated.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-25(2) (emphasis added).
Michels have made much in their appeal of the fact that a portion of the Subject Property
has now been determined to lie in Salt Lake County. They stipulated, however, that the majority
of the property lies in Utah County. The problem here is that Michels rely, in support of their
16

Note that, even in the Christenson deposition excerpts on which Michels improperly attempt to
rely, Mr. Christenson was never able to identify which trust he signed for. With or without
"parol evidence", then, Michels cannot name the grantor.
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claim of title, exclusively upon the April 14,1993 Trustee's Deed Upon Sale issued by Zions
Bank. That deed, however, states in the fourth recital,
WHEREAS, Trustee in consequence of said Declaration of Default, Election,
demand for sale, and in compliance with the sale stating that it, as such Trustee,
by virtue of the authority in it vested, would sell at auction to the highest bidder
for cash, in lawful money of the United States the property particularly therein and
hereinafter described, said property being in the County of Salt Lake and Utah,
State of Utah, and fixing the time and place of sale as April 13, 1993, at the hour
of 10:15 a.m., on the front steps of the Courts Building (north side), 240 East 400
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, . . .
(Emphasis added.)
The Trustee's Sale, then, occurred "on the front steps of the Courts Building (north side),
240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah." While a sale in that location was permissible for the
property located in Salt Lake County17, it was impermissible for the bulk of the Subject Property
which is undisputably located in Utah County. Therefore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-25
(2), Defendants could not have taken any interest in the Subject Property located in Utah County
pursuant to the Trustee's Sale held on April 13, 1993.
CONCLUSION
Richard A. Christenson (individually) received a valid conveyance of the Subject
Property pursuant to the 1984 tax deed. The sale suffered no "jurisdictional infirmity" due to the
discovery, more than a decade later, of a survey inaccuracy. In all events, any discrepancies in
the 1984 sale fell within the curative statute four years thereafter.

17

The trial court properly found that Michels paid a grand total of $25,000 for both the Salt Lake
County parcel and the Utah County Parcel (R622-630). Even if Michels are limited to the 60acre parcel in Salt Lake County acquired at the sale, they obtained a significant bargain.
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The 1997 deed from Mr. Christenson to TWN, moreover, was effective to transfer to
TWN the interest which Mr. Christenson received from the 1984 tax sale. The intervening 1985
Quitclaim Deed to Zion First National Bank was executed by Mr. Christenson in his
representative capacity as a trustee, and conveyed no personal interest of his own. Michels'
attempt to bolster the 1985 Quitclaim Deed with contradictory parole evidence is both illegal and
unavailing - the language of the deed (where relevant to the issue before the trial court) was
unambiguous: Mr. Christenson was signing as a trustee, not as an individual. Michels failed,
moreover, to produce any extrinsic evidence establishing the contrary. Michels did, however,
highlight a fundamental infirmity in the 1985 Quitclaim Deed sufficient to defeat its operation
entirely.
Finally, Michels' own root of title is legally flawed, in that the trust deed sale upon which
they rely was conducted in the wrong county.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that the trial court properly held, as a
matter of law, that TWN holds title to the Subject Property, free and clear of any claim by
Michels. For this reason, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
DATED: July3/_, 2002
JONES, WALDO, HOLB#6oK & McDONOUGH

*
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